Author: Alex Poulos

Software Developer and Scholar of Greek and Latin Literature

Essay Excerpt: Ignatius and θεοφορός (Part One)

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Here’s an excerpt from the essay I wrote on Paul and Ignatius. It concerns his use of the term θεοφορός, ‘God-bearer.’

We may begin our analysis of Ignatius by examining the term Θεοφορός, the title that Ignatius uses at the beginning of all letters: “Ἰγνάτιος, ὁ καὶ Θεοφόρος.” The term is a compound of the noun θεὸς and the participle φορὸς, meaning “God-bearer.” The interpretation of this term is controversial, but it has the ability to shed light on Ignatius’ self-understanding and the depth of his identification with Christ. Two interpretative options will be given, and then I will show the participatory implications of both.

The first option presents the term functioning as an additional name for Ignatius. Thus, Lightfoot translates the opening, “Ignatius, also called Theophorus,” and leaves the term untranslated. Supporters of the second option believe the word functions as a semi-technical cultic title that has been re-appropriated in a Christian way. Holmes thus translates the phrase this way, “Ignatius the Image-bearer.” The adaptation in this case would come from Greco-Roman epiphany processions. In these processions, an “image-bearer” would carry an image that was supposed to mediate the presence of a deity. Some argue that this is the material Paul is drawing on when he speaks of “always bearing (περιφεροντες) in our bodies the death of Jesus.” Likewise, it is argued that Ignatius is using Pagan cultic practices and redrawing them around Jesus.

Reading θεοφορός as an additional name readily coheres with what we know of early Christianity. Early Christian leaders regularly had name changes, or additional names given. Saul became Paul following his conversion in the narrative of Acts. Even more famously, Simon became Peter in Matthew 16:18. Names had important theological implications, in both the Old and New Testaments. There are copious examples to choose from, but one famous example comes from Isaiah 7:14 where the child was to be named “Immanuel” meaning “God with us.” Of course, this gets picked up by the New Testament writers and applied to Jesus. So even if θεοφορός is an additional name for Ignatius, it is still legitimate to explore the theological implications of the term. The idea of “bearing God” in his body certainly shaped Ignatius as he reflected on his approaching death.

The second option reads θεοφορός as a title that has been drawn from the Greco-Roman epiphany processions. Since a θεοφορός denoted the personal carrying an image of a deity in these Pagan practices, this reading argues that Ignatius draws on this practice, redefining it in Christian terms. Instead of mediating the presence of a god through an image, Ignatius as a θεοφορός would evoke notions of carrying the presence of God in his own body. He is the true “God-bearer”, over against the pagan θεοφόροι. This reading is particularly strong if Paul is doing the same thing in 2 Corinthians. For several reasons, I find this reading more plausible. Ignatius uses the term when referring to the Ephesian Church in Ephesians 9:2. Holmes notes that if θεοφορός is functioning as a name, “it would be the first instance of such a usage.” Finally, it may function as a parallel to Paul’s use of ἀπόστολος. However, we will see strong participatory significance in either case.

First, if θεοφορός is a name for Ignatius, then it is would have played a significant part in his self-reflection. It may have been given to him at his baptism, or at some other significant even in his life. It may have come out of a charismatic experience similar to what he describes in Philadelphians, or that Paul describes in 1 Corinthians 14. One cannot do much more than speculate about the source of the name, but if it were a name then it surely would have had significance.

On the other hand, if θεοφορός is a title, then Ignatius is deliberately making an ironic ploy. In this case, he defines himself over against the pagan image-bearers as the “image-bearer” of the one, true God. The image is not an idol made of gold, but rather his own body and ministry. The presence of God within him is best seen as he participates in the suffering of Christ. Indeed, he speaks of “rejoicing in the suffering of our Lord” (Ign Phld Salutation).

We may further note the similarity between θεοφορός for Ignatius and ἀπόστολος for Paul. Structurally, they come at nearly identical places in the letter. Paul most often begins his letters with, “Παυλος ἀπόστολος.” Ignatius begins every one of his letters with “Ιγνάτιος ὁ και θεοφορός.” The immediate difference is the presence of the article ὁ and the conjunction καὶ. Still, the similarities are significant. Paul’s self-understanding as an apostle of Jesus shaped and influenced everything he did. We see this throughout his letters, but especially in 2 Corinthians, which we examined earlier. I suggest that θεοφορός shares similar significance for Ignatius. This is a strong claim, and would take rather detailed exegesis to argue in full detail. For now it is sufficient to note the participatory significance of θεοφορός. At the present, we may finally turn to the texts in more detail.

Perhaps more to come…

DOG: Some Hermeneutical Clarifications

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Other parts to this series can be found on my Deliverance of God page.

This post concerns Part Two of five in The Deliverance of God. Part Two is much shorter than Part One and Part Three. It’s entitled “Some Hermeneutical Clarifications.” As one would imagine, this part functions as groundwork for his exegetical discussions in Parts Three to Five. The first chapter in this part deals with the “nature of reading.” He moves from the exegetical level (individual verses or sets of verses) up through argumentative (passages), framing (sets of arguments), and theoretical (essentially systematic theology). He argues that readings need to satisfy on all of these levels.

In this chapter he lays out a methodology for examining Romans and Justification theory. Basically, he envisages a sequence of “overdeterminations” and “underdeterminations.” A textual overdetermination is something in the text which is not accounted for in the theory. A textual underdetermination is the opposite: something in the theory which is not accounted for properly in the text. These complement “theoretical under/overdeterminations,” so a textual overdetermination is a theoretical underdetermination, and vice versa. It’s a simple yet elegant methodology. Graphically, it works something like this:

Textual Overdetermination <——-> Theoretical Underdetermination
Textual Underdetermination <——-> Theoretical Overdetermination

What exactly these work out to will be seen in Part Three. The remainder of Part Two deals with two issues: the Church-historical setting of JT, and the “Modern European Pedigree” of JT. His goal here is to “clear the air” before the exegetical work commences. The “Church-Historical Pedigree” is the subject of the next chapter. Here he deals with Luther and Calvin in relation to JT. He places them both in positive and negative relation to JT, meaning that he notes both points in their writings where they promulgate JT, and where they promulgate something different. He then examines Augustine, claiming that he abandons key points of JT later in his life (namely because of the Pelagian controversy). Campbell concludes that Luther, Calvin, and Augustine can be deployed on both sides of the JT debate, though he does note their importance in furthering JT.

The final chapter of Part Two deals with the “Modern European Pedigree.” The chief base of this pedigree is that JT concords with certain principles of “philosophical individualism.” He then traces Justification through as a paradigm which is foundational both for conservatives and liberals. He notes Billy Graham and Bill Bright’s “Four Spiritual Laws” on one hand, and figures culminating in Bultmann on the other. He concludes by noting that JT corresponds suspiciously to the “modern, liberal individual” (liberal in the sense of post-Enlightnment). The purpose is to highlight certain interpretative tendencies that stem from these inherited traditions. Still, it does seem odd for a book primarily about Pauline theology. Campbell leaves no stone uncovered: he tracks JT down through the ages and shows its interaction with any number of things: governments, individuals, or philosophies. This result is that JT gets wound up being implicated in all sorts of bad things: Constantianism, the liberal-nation state, capitalism, etc. I’m yet to be convinced of all of this: I’m wondering if these are “overdeterminations” on Campbell’s part (to use his own parlance).

Regardless, Part Two is concluded. We may finally proceed to the exegesis in Part Three.

~alex

DOG: The Problems of Justification Theory

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Other parts to this series can be found on my Deliverance of God page.

Campbell spends the first part of his book highlighting problems with the traditional Protestant understanding of Paul, which he dubs “Justification Theory.” (hereafter Justification, or JT) Often called the “Lutheran reading,” a summary of it can be found here. This description takes up the first chapter of the book.

Campbell then moves onto highlighting the difficulties of Justification. He proceeds on several levels. His first list is at the “intrinsic level.” These are difficulties which are present before examining passages that support other readings. One example is JT’s understanding of humankind (anthropology). Justification posits that mankind is both intrinsically depraved and sinful, but simultaneously capable of rationally deducing certain properties about God. These include certain moral rules, a day of judgement based on merit, etc. Humanity is intelligent enough to reason their way to most of the things in the “Premises” and the “Loop of Despair” in the JT outline. This of course clashes with a humanity that is “in the futility of their thinking. They are darkened in their understanding and separated from the life of God because of the ignorance that is in them due to the hardening of their hearts.” (Ephesians 4:17-19) Basically, you get a tension: two paradoxical descriptions of humanity. Likewise, Campbell questions JT on grounds of theodicy. The problem is this: God demands absolute, 100% obedience to the law to get into Heaven. Yet, as we have seen, humanity is incapable of this. How can God be just if his demands are impossible to fulfill? He notes several others, but we can move onto the next type of tension.

Campbell then moves onto systematic difficulties in JT. These are difficulties that JT experiences when put next to other Pauline passages, chiefly Romans 5-8. Campbell constructs an “alternate soteriology” from Romans 5-8 and compares it to Romans 1-4. He then highlights the tensions. Some of these are repeats from the intrinsic difficulties (his charge of a paradoxical anthropology is strengthened by his reading of Rom 5-8). He also gives tensions on other grounds, like ecclesiology (nature of the Church), the nature of faith (faith is surprisingly low key in Rom 5-8) and theology (what is God’s fundamental attribute?). His case it very persuasive here. If only a few tensions existed, they would probably be reconcilable. The nature of theology is such that one learns to live with tensions. However, he has placed the bar quite high for anyone wanting to reconcile the traditional reading of Romans 1-4 with other parts of Paul’s thought, especially Romans 5-8.

The final difficulty that Campbell notes is Judaism. Campbell claims that JT makes certain empirical claims about Judaism that are demonstrably false. JT states, for instance, the Judaism is a law of legalism which ultimately leads to the “loop of despair” in the outline. The classic reading of Paul has a highly polemicized picture of Judaism which has plagued Europe for hundreds of years (Luther was a raving anti-semite remember, probably his deepest character flaw). This found its terrible climax in the Holocaust and the Nazi atrocities. It’s important not to attribute these horrible things to Christian theology, however the Lutheran caricature of Judaism certainly didn’t help the matter. Against JT’s claim of Judaism as a religion of “works-righteousness” and “legalism,” Campbell largely follows the work of E.P. Sanders. However, he reorients some of his claims, and puts them on a sounder theoretical base (according to Campbell anyway). Essentially, Campbell argues that Sanders’ work has punched an empirical hole in JT.

The final chapter in Part One deals with interpretative dilemmas that JT has influenced. He starts with the dilemmas faced by Pauline interpreters. Krister Stendahl’s work on introspection is the first he explores. He then moves onto the Participatory emphases, especially noting Wrede’s construal of Paul’s gosepl. After a few more interpretative tensions, he proceeds to “Broader concerns in the Pre-Christian Vestibule.” These problems include Natural Theology, Post-Holocaust, Christian Relationships with Government, and a few other things. The final section of dilemmas deals with the “Consequent Construal of Christianity.” Many of these dilemmas have been raised by Orthodox and Catholics. They include the charge that JT is not sufficiently Trinitarian, or that it caricatures the role of the Holy Spirit and/or Christ. The sacraments also have a section here. Essentially, Campbell raises a whole host of interpretative quandaries that are at least partially influenced by JT. He argues that displacing JT as the primary reading of Paul will help or solve many of these dilemmas. With this charge, Part One closes.

~alex

Greek Memorization/Translation: 1 Cor 7:9-16

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The text:
9.) ει δε ουκ ενκρατευονται, γαμησατωσαν. χρειττον γαρ εστιν γαμησαι η πορυσθαι.
10.) τοις δε γεγαμηκουσιν παραγγελω, ουκ εγω αλλα ὸ κυριος. γυναικα απο ανδρος μη χωριςθηναι.
11.) εαν δε και κωρισθῃ, μενετω αγαμος η τῳ ανδρι καταλλαγετω, και ανδρα γυναικα μη αφιεναι.
12.) τοις δε λοιποις λεγω, εγω ουχ ὸ κυριος. ει τις αδελφος γυναικα εχει απιςτον και αυτη συνευδοκει οικειν μετ᾽ αυτου, μη αφιετω αυτην.
13.) και γυνη, ει τις εχει ανδρα απιστον, και ὃυτος συνευδοκει οικειν μετ᾽ αυτης, με αφιετω τον ανδρα.
14.) ἣγιασται ὁ ανερ ὁ απιστον εν τῃ γυναικι και ἡγιασται ἡ γυνη ἡ απιστον εν τῃ αδελφῳ. επει αρα τα τεκνα υμων ακαθαρτα εστιν, νυν δε ἁγια εστιν.
15.) ει δε ὁ απιστος κορισθῃ, κοριζεσθω. ου δεδολωται ὁ αδελφος η ἡ αδελφη εν τοις τοιουτοις. εν δε ειρηνῃ κεκλεκεν υμας ὁ θεος.
16.) τι γαρ οιδας γυναι, ει τον ανδρα σοσεις; η τι οιδας ανερ, ει την γυναικα σοσεις;

The Translation:
9.) But if they can’t control themselves, they should marry, for it is better to marry than to burn with passion.
10.) To the married I give this command, not I, but the Lord. A woman must not separate from her husband.
11.) But if she separates, she must remain unmarried or be reconciled to her husband. And a man must not divorce his wife.
12.) To the rest I say, I not the Lord, If a brother has an unbelieving wife and she is willing to live with him, he should not divorce her.
13.) And if a woman has an unbelieving husband, and he is willing to live with her, she should not divorce the husband.
14.) For the unbelieving man is sanctified by the believing wife, and the unbelieving woman is sanctified by the believing husband.
15.) But if the unbeliever leaves, let them be separated. A believing man or woman is not bound in such circumstances, as God has called you to peace.
16.) Who knows, woman, if you’ll save your husband? Who knows, man, if you’ll save your wife?

Some Notes:
The big translation issue here it how to render αδελφος. Literally, it means “brother” or “sister.” Paul is using it figuratively here to mean “fellow Christian.” In fact, this is his favorite word for “Christian” (he actually never uses the Greek word for Christian). Keeping it as brother (or sister) helps communicate the familial nature of the Church. However, it’s also going to confuse those who don’t understand the language. Christians were accused of incest for a long time because they referred to one another as “brother” and “sister.” For instance, in 1 Corinthians 9, Paul writes that he has the right to take a “sister” as a wife. He means a female Christian, but it does sound funny ;-) Pagans made a natural inference when hearing stuff like this, though an incorrect one.

Theologically, I love v. 14. In some way, having a single Christian in a home “makes holy” the rest of the home. The participatory aspects (being in Christ) of 14 and 16 are quite interesting, as I noted here. I also love Paul’s practicality here. As I delve into theology, history, and biblical studies, I hope I can maintain the deep practicality of all of it.

 εν αυτῳ,
~alex

Summer Reading

~ Alex Poulos ~ 2 Comments

Right now, I’m debating what to do with the free time I’ll have over the Summer.  There’s lots of authors I’d like to get to, including N.T. Wright’s scholarly stuff, Gordon Fee, etc.  I need to finish Campbell’s The Deliverance of God.  The summer will likely be focused on Paul and Greek, since I’m taking a Paul class in the Fall.   However, I might spiff up this Paul/Ignatius paper a little bit.

Any suggestions for the Amazon Wish List?

~alex

Status Update

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So I’ve dropped almost completely off the radar the past couple of weeks.  I’ve had tons going on at work and school (err, the typical excuse ;-) )  I’ve also been writing a rather large paper (it’ll end up being 25pgs probably)  for my Early Christianity class on Ignatius’ use of Paul, which has consumed lots of my writing energy.  On the plus side, I should be able to post more often now since things are slowing down *somewhat*.  I’ll likely blog portions of the essay I’ve been writing, which has been a blast so far.  I’m arguing that Ignatius’ understanding of martyrdom was shaped extensively by a “participatory” understanding of Paul.  Lot’s of good stuff :-)

more soon!

~alex

Greek Translation: 1 Cor 7:6-8

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The text:

6.) τουτο δε λεγω κατα συγγνωμεν ου κατ῾ επιταγην.
7.) θελω δε παντας ανθρωπους ειναι ὡς και εμαυτον. αλλα παντα εχει ιδιον χαρισμα εκ θεου. ὁ μεν ουτως, ὁ δε ουτως.
8.) λεγω δε τοις αγαμοις και ταις χηραις, καλον αυτοις εαν μεινωσιν ως καγω.

A rough translation:
6.) I’m saying this as a concession, and not as a command.
7.) I’d like for all to be as I am. However, all have their own gift from God. One has this gift, another that.
8.) To the widows and widowers I say: it is good for them to remain as I am.

Some notes:
6.) I’m thinking τουτο (this) refers to the instruction in 2/3-5, though I’m not sure.
7.) I’ve translated θελω very lightly as “I would like.” I think Paul is speaking rather lightly here, on the level of wish or preference. He’s quick to point out that not everyone has the gift that he does.
8.) The question here is precisely the meaning of αγαμοις. Most literally, it means unmarried. But in light of the rest of the passage, I think he’s speaking specifically to widowers, especially since χηρα seems to refer only to women. If that’s the case, then it might support the hypothesis that Paul himself was a widower, though pushing beyond singleness as the meaning of the “as I am” statements needs to be done carefully.

Meditating on the “gift of celibacy” is something that we Protestants should probably do more of. What does Paul mean when he speaks of singleness as a gift? What does it mean for a wife or husband to a gift? It’s a worthy line of thought methinks.

~alex

DoG: The Approach

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Other parts to this series can be found on my Deliverance of God page.

The approach of Campbell’s Deliverance of God is a bit different from what one may expect. The book is not primarily exegesis! Exegesis plays a big, important role in the argument, but it’s not primary. The argument is theory driven. This seems strange at first glance. In good protestant form, I too want to jump into Scripture first and sort out the results later. But Campbell’s theoretical approach is rather powerful for several reasons.

The basic argument works in five parts. Part One consists of a description of Justification Theory on a theoretical level. After describing JT, he explores the difficulty of this particular reading. He examines both intrinsic difficulties (those within JT itself) and systematic difficulties (those seen when compared to Pauline texts, especially Romans 5-8). Part One continues with Campbell’s critique of JT’s depiction of Judaism and its account of conversion itself. It ends with Campbell concluding that JT is responsible for many of the interpretive dilemmas in Pauline scholarship and within the Church as a whole.

Even after this theoretical examination of Justification Theory, Campbell doesn’t immediately jump into the exegesis (close reading of a Biblical text) right away. Instead, he begins with some interpretive (hermeneutical) considerations. The primary reason for doing this is that Campbell believes that “an important, and possible quite insidious, set of interpretative dynamics is operative that can distort any naive or merely unselfconscious approach to the texts” (221). For Campbell, these must be grasped and neutralized as much as possible before we can simply “read Paul.” In Part Two he builds an interpretive base for working with the texts. He also some gives some history of interpretation of Paul, including a highlight of the Reformer’s reading of Paul. Finally, he looks at some dangers that surround reading Paul in a modern European (or North American) setting. Only with these interpretive dilemmas and warnings presented does he finally proceed with exegesis.

Parts Three through Five deals directly with the Biblical texts. Part Three deals with Justification Theory and the texts which are used to support it. It primarily deals with Romans 1-4 as the “textual fortress” on which JT rests (Douglas’s metaphor). Part Four offers a rereading of Romans 1-4 (probably the most provocative piece of the argument. Part Five then extends this rereading of Romans 1-4 to the rest of Romans, as well as to other key texts which have been used to support JT.

I’m still working through Part Two at the moment, so I can’t comment on his exegesis yet. However, I must say that his approach is noteworthy. Starting with the theoretical models and working to the texts is novel, but I think it’s helpful and even necessary. He’s correct in that a “completely unbiased” reading of the text is impossible. We’re greatly influenced by the traditions we have received, regardless of their source. Highlighting these inherited “interpretative tendencies” is necessary work as we start to examine the texts. It keeps us honest and hopefully humble as we dialog with one another about the meaning of the Scriptures. I know I’ll find stuff to take issue with, but I’m deeply impressed at the breadth and depth of his argument.

~alex

DoG: The Heart of the Matter: The Justifcation Theory of Salvation

~ Alex Poulos ~ 1 Comment

Other parts to this series can be found on my Deliverance of God page

As part of my summary and (slight) analysis of Campbell’s The Deliverance of God (hereafter DoG), I will condense and articulate Justification Theory as Campbell states it.  Justification Theory (or JT) is Campbell’s name for the classic Protestant statement of the core of the Gospel, namely Justification by Faith alone.  Historically, this is often called the “Lutheran” reading, but Campbell opts for “Justification Theory” instead.

DoG is fundamentally a critique and rejection of Justification Theory.  Campbell appropriately begins his tome with his articulation of JT.  He acknowledges that he is susceptible to creating a “straw man,” but strives to articulate the “opponent’s reading” as well as he can.  For the sake of discussion on the blog here, it’s also necessary to state what JT says.  Growing up in a Protestant church, JT was rarely explained in full, but it was certainly latent in our thinking.  So, now we can begin!

Campbell describes Justification Theory as a soteriology (theory of salvation) of two contracts.  The first one is rigorous, and the second one is generous.  The first contract goes something like this:

  • Premises
    • Humans are rational, self-interested and ethical.
    • God is omnipotent and just.
    • Everyone knows God is omnipotent from examining the Universe.
    • Everyone knows God is just from their own conscience.
    • God’s ethical demands are made known to Jews through the Old Testament laws.
    • God’s ethical demands are made known to everyone else innately (through their conscience)
    • Rewards and punishments will be meted out by God in accordance to a person’s obedience or disobedience of these ethical demands.  (Have you obeyed or not?)
    • Present injustices will be resolved at the end of time on the day of judgment.
    • The future age will have a positive aspect (heaven) and a negative one (hell).
    • God will determine an individual’s destiny based on their merit, whether they’ve obeyed his ethical laws or not (in accordance with Romans 2:6-10).
  • The Introspective Twist and the Loop of Despair
    • As we try to fulfill God’s ethical demands, we fail.  After failing, we try harder to fulfill God’s demands.
    • The harder we try, the worse we fail.
    • This results in a “Loop of Despair,” where we grow more and more depressed as we realize we cannot fulfill God’s ethical demands.
  • At this point, the “Generous Contract” enters:
    • God redirects, graciously, the punishment we deserve to Christ (who dies).
    • Because of his sinlessness and divinity, Christ can offer unlimited satisfaction of divine justice through his sacrificial death.
    • God redirects, generously, the perfect righteousness of Christ to sinners who are now viewed as if this righteousness were their own.
    • God, again graciously, offers faith as the criterion for accessing this righteousness.  This is manageable, unlike the the rigors of the first contract.
    • Individuals who have this faith access the perfect righteousness of Christ and will receive a favorable judgment on the day of judgment (they’ll go to Heaven).

Campbell goes through these in more detail, but that will suffice as a depiction of JT.  Toward the end of chapter 1, he lists these as the “root” metaphors of Justification Theory:

  • Humanity is ultimately individual, rationalistic, and self-interested. Humans are primarily cognitive (thinking is our most basic task).  By thinking, we discern the second “root” idea:
  • God is primarily an authority figure of strict justice. The “philosophical man” discerns the most fundamental divine attribute is retributive justice (that is, God punishes wrongdoing and rewards right-doing).
  • Humanity perceives itself to be “ethically incapable.” Humanity tries to do right in light of God’s justice, but is unable to fulfill these commands.
  • There needs to be compensatory mechanism of satisfaction, namely, Christ’s atonement. Jesus’ death pays for the sins from which humanity cannot escape.
  • The criterion of salvation is faith.   An individual accesses this work of Christ by believing in the revelation of Christ’s death and resurrection.

Campbell is working here on the theoretical level.  He only wants to with JT on a theoretical level since his approach is “theory” driven.  Discussion of the key Biblical texts will come later, but right now he wants to highlight the integrity (and also the difficulties) of JT before interacting with the important texts.

I’ll respond a little bit to his method in a separate post, but I find his articulation of the classic interpretation fair.  Admittedly, I haven’t done a tone of reading on classical Protestant theology, but it does fit will with both my reading and my experience growing up in Church.  If there’s something “amiss” in this representation, please let me know.  I’ve cut out a lot to make the summary manageable, so it’s likely I left something important out!

~alex